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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is an analysis of Puerto Rico's colonial status
under the United States, and the prospects afforded by Interna-
tional Law for its decolonization. There is a consensus in Puerto
Rico, despite a divided electorate, that none of the traditional op-
tions of independence, statehood, or the status quo, commands
overwhelming majority support. There is also a growing consensus
that the status quo is no longer satisfactory. The U.S. government,
meanwhile, continues to support the status quo through its de-
clared policy of self-determination for Puerto Rico. Thus, in effect,
the United States declares that it supports the Puerto Rican ab-
sence of consensus to end what a growing consensus thinks is inad-
equate. In the words of Robert Pastor, a former senior staff mem-
ber in charge of Latin American and Caribbean affairs on the
National Security Council from 1977 to 1981, "Washington re-
mains insensitive to the level of frustration, bordering in some
cases on desperation, which many Puerto Rican leaders feel, sim-
ply because the federal government does not view Puerto Rico as a
colony." 1 Pastor proposes a procedure for mutual determination as
a method of ending a status which, in his view, permits "institu-
tionalized inferiority under the democratic roof of the United
States."'
This enlightened view by a former U.S. policy-maker, leaving
aside the merits of his specific proposal, appears closer to prevalent
notions in the international community. Colonialism in practice
entails the making of fundamental decisions which affect another
people's destiny and life as a people. It involves such fundamental
decisions as the determination of their citizenship and nationality,
their ability to relate to the rest of the world, and their legal and
constitutional structures and traditions. This decision-making
power rests, at least in part, upon the immoral assumption of the
colonizer's superiority over the colonized. Thus, to sustain or sup-
port a colonial status is to negate democratic notions of equality.
Colonialism therefore poses a constant threat to world peace and
stability, which are premised on the legal notion of sovereign
equality. On this basis, international law has outlawed colonialism.
Since the end of World War II, most of humanity has escaped
from the subjugation and constraints of colonialism, and has
1. Pastor, The United States and Puerto Rico: A Proposal, 7 WASH. Q. 56 (1984).
2. Id. at 65.
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sought to organize itself legally and politically into independent
sovereign nation-states. The U.N. General Assembly has declared
that "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights,
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impedi-
ment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."' In this
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, the United Nations further declared that
"All peoples have the right to self-determination,4 [and that]
[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social or educational prepared-
ness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." 5
It mandated that, in non-self-governing and Trust Territories or
all other territories which had not yet attained independence, im-
mediate steps be taken to effectuate a transfer of all powers so that
they would freely enjoy independence.'
In April 1985, Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua, a distin-
guished scholar, lawyer and journalist published a newspaper col-
umn in Puerto Rico entitled, The Republic in 1992.1 In this and
subsequent columns, Garcia-Passalacqua forecast a compact to es-
tablish an "Associated Republic" status for Puerto Rico by 1992.
This suggestion came as quite a surprise to those who had cam-
paigned and been elected to the government in the 1984 elections
on Governor Hernindez Col6n's not-so-novel theme that Puerto
Rico's status was not, and should not be, at issue. The electorate
was likewise surprised.a
Garcia-Passalacqua's important contribution has been to make
everyone else aware of some basic tenets which should not be for-
gotten. First, colonial powers maintain colonies in the manner
most beneficial to them. Colonies are customarily cast aside when
they become too burdensome, costly or embarassing. Second, colo-
nial powers will attempt to transform colonial possessions into
3. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/15/Supp.16
(1960).
4. Id. at pars. 2.
5. Id. at pars. 3.
6. Id. at para. 5.
7. La repzblica en 1992, El Nuevo Dia (San Juan, P.R.), Apr. 23, 1985.
8. But see Rivera Lacourt, El status est6 en issue, El Reportero, July 17, 1986, at 19. In
this brief newspaper column, attorney Rivera Lacourt, a long-time independence advocate,
concisely chronicles the salient historical reasons which underscore the senselessness of de-
nying the status question a central role in Puerto Rico's political development. As evidence
of how alive the status question remains, see Skelly, Dimes y diretes por el "status," El
Nuevo DIa, July 18, 1986, at 8, cols, 1-3.
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close allies until, in the course of human events, they are inte-
grated or rendered independent to various degrees along a power
spectrum. Third, the central government will, in any case, seek to
maintain close ties and an indispensable role for itself as a peace-
keeping, ordering benefactor. Of crucial importance, Garcia-Pass-
alacqua's columns have helped to awaken some people to a simple
fact. Since a compact of the kind to which he referred was becom-
ing a reality between the United States and some of the govern-
ments of the Trust Territories of the Pacific region historically
known as Micronesia, it could, therefore, sooner or later, happen to
Puerto Rico.
An extensive, in-depth analysis of the Compact of Free Associ-
ation enacted by the U.S. Congress on January 14, 1986, is not
within the scope of this article. A few key provisions, however, will
be examined here, bearing in mind the central question for our
purposes: Would such an arrangement serve to satisfy the
decolonization mandate of international law in the case of Puerto
Rico?
II. THE STATUS Quo
The ultimate decision-making power over Puerto Rico resides
in the government of the United States. The preemptive nature of
federal authority over Puerto Rico under the Constitutional system
9. Prof. Roger S. Clark, in his fine article, Self-Determination and Free Associa-
tion-Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1 (1980), provides a more detailed account of the Compact as initialed by the parties in
1980. In this article, Prof. Clark concludes that these free association arrangements "proba-
bly conform to the requirements of the relevant United Nations norms." Id. at 84. I would
probably reach the opposite conclusion, based on the interaction of that version's substan-
tive provisions regarding economic assistance and the security and defense provisions. Nev-
ertheless, after examining subsequent versions of the Compact, including the 1986 version
enacted by the U.S. Congress, P.L. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770, Prof. Clark, speaking to the U.N.
Trusteeship Council on behalf of the International League for Human Rights has more re-
cently stated that "[T]he Compact falls foul [of) general principles of law recognized in the
international community .... It is contrary to the decolonization standards of the interna-
tional community, and just plain unconscionable." Clark, Petition Concerning the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands (International League for Human Rights, May 13, 1986) at
8. See also Clark, Statement to the Sub-Committee on Petitions, Information, and Assis-
tance of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Interna-
tional League for Human Rights, May 16 1986) (obtained by Prof. Clark's courtesy to this
author). In this, I agree with Prof. Clark. I would stress, however, that my purpose here is to
explore whether this type of arrangement would comply with decolonization requirements in
the case of Puerto Rico.
[Vol. 18:3
DECOLONIZATION OF PUERTO RICO
of the United States cannot be denied. ' U.S. control and preemp-
tive authority over Puerto Rico could be rationalized as non-colo-
nial under a democratic and egalitarian interpretation of Constitu-
tional Law only if Puerto Rico were considered a territory under
the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution." However, for the
occupation of Puerto Rico by the United States to be clearly non-
colonial, this territory would have to have been considered, under
current international legal precepts, terra nulius, or no one's land,
at the time.'" Some of the westward expansion of the original
states of the union may have proceeded on the basis of the occupa-
tion of uninhabited territories, 8 but U.S. rule over Puerto Rico
since the military conquest on July 25, 1898, cannot be justified on
this basis. Nor can this invasion be used to justify the unchanged
economic and political structures of Puerto Rico's continuing colo-
nial status." Puerto Rico is, and at the time of the U.S. invasion
already was, an emerging nation. As any student of, or visitor to
Puerto Rico would realize, Puerto Rico is a Latin American nation
of the Caribbean region, with all of the sociological, historical, and
cultural attributes which this entails. "
In 1953, the United States notified the United Nations that
Puerto Rico had achieved self-government under the common-
wealth status enacted by the U.S. Congress through legislation in
1950 and 1952.1' The United States would therefore, and thereaf-
10. See GARCIA-PASSALACQUA PUERTO Rico: EQuALrrY AND FREEDOM AT ISSUE 44 (1984).
11. For an interesting discussion of the intellectual and political debates which en-
shrined today's constitutional law notions regarding territories, see J. TORRUELLA, TiE SU-
PREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DocrsNE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985). A central
point which Torruella, an advocate of statehood for Puerto Rico, stresses is that the sensi-
ble, non-colonial meaning of territory refers to the stage of incorporation into the U.S. Con-
stitutional system preceding statehood. Torruella is a Puerto Rican appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
12. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion).
13. The history of native Americans, however, may serve to cast a different light on the
theory of this westward expansion across the North American continent.
14. This is, however, the net import of a long line of judicial decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States from the early line of cases known as the "Insular Cases," down
to Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ratified the power of
the U.S. Congress under the Territorial Clause, to "treat Puerto Rico differently from States
so long as there is a rational basis for its actions." Id. at 651-52. See also GARCfh-PAssmLAc-
QUA. supra note 10, at 43-55; TORRUIELLA, supra note 11, at 40-115, 159, and 267-68.
15. See generally F. Pic6, HIsTomiA GENERAL DE PUERTO Rico (1986). Regarding the
sociological struggles and cultural challenges which still confront the Puerto Rican national-
ity, see J.L. GONZALEZ, EL PAS DE CUATEO PISOS V OTROS ENSAYOS (1980).
16. Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950); Pub. L. No. 447, 66 Stat. 327 (1952) (codified
at 48 U.S.C. §731 (1950, 1952)).
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ter did, cease transmitting information to the U.N. under Article
73e of the Charter. The United Nations narrowly accepted this de-
cision in General Assembly Resolution 748, through a questionable
process which, given U.S. hegemony in this international forum at
the time, denied the political opposition in Puerto Rico (including
the Puerto Rican Independence Party, then the largest minority
party) the right to be heard. 7
In spite of the reorganization of the colonial administration of
Puerto Rico which took place under the pretense of a new consti-
tutional status between 1950-1952, the political and economic
structure of Puerto Rico has remained unchanged since the U.S.
military invasion and acquisition of Puerto Rico in 1898.18 If the
U.N. Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Im-
plementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the Decolonization Committee
created under the aegis of Resolution 1514 of 1960) had been in
existence seven years earlier, the 1953 action by the General As-
sembly may not have taken place. This is less in the realm of spec-
ulation than one might suppose. The unlikelihood of the United
Nations' recognizing the current status of Puerto Rico as a
decolonizing formula today, seems clear. As Hurst Hannum has
pointed out, Puerto Rico's "lack of any foreign relations capacity
and its apparent inability to unilaterally alter its status militate
against its possessing self-government as that term would now be
defined by the United Nations.""
The fact that colonialism is alive and well in Puerto Rico is by
now an open secret. Jos6 A. Cabranes, a former functionary of the
Puerto Rican government and currently a federal judge on the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut has aptly phrased it:
"The problem of Puerto Rico is colonialism, and decolonization
stands at the front and center of the island's politics and its rela-
17. See Clark, Self-Determination, supra note 9, at 41-42.
18. See GARCIA-PASSALACQUA, supra note 14; see also Rodriguez-Orellana, The
Decolonization of Puerto Rico in Light of International Legal Precedents: A Case for Post-
Independence Advocacy, 5 B.C. TRD. W.L.J. 45, 48-62 (1984).
19. Hannum, The Theory and Practice of Governmental Autonomy: Final Report for
the Department of State Vol.1, THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATrONAL LAW INSTITUTE
204-205 (1980) [hereinafter PAIL REPoRT]. See also Clark, Self-Determination, supra note
9, at 46. Note: U.N. General Assembly resolutions do not carry the force of precedent associ-
ated with the common law notion of stare decisis, but acquire the force of law only when, as
in the case of Res. 1514, they are generally regarded as a norm of international law. This,
besides the continuing existence of Puerto Rican nationalism, explains in part why the case
of Puerto Rico is not moot.
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tions with the United States, now and for the foreseeable future.""0
The ever-increasing deterioration of social and economic con-
ditions in Puerto Rico makes a change of the present constitu-
tional, legal and political situation not only desirable, but neces-
sary. U.N. Resolution 1514 of 1960, and the Advisory Opinions of
the International Court of Justice in the cases of Namibia2" and
Western Sahara 2 concluding that the principles of Resolution 1514
have become a norm of international law, make a juridical change
of Puerto Rico's status mandatory. One must therefore look to in-
ternational law for guidance in exploring avenues which are realis-
tically open in the process of re-defining Puerto Rico's relationship
with the United States and the rest of the international
community.
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR DECOLONIZATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Resolution 1514 of the U.N. General Assembly has come to
embody a substantive norm of international law requiring an end
to colonialism in all of its manifestations. The Resolution itself de-
clares this objective. The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has
recognized this resolution as the impetus for the process of
decolonization which has resulted in the creation of many nation-
states which have become members of the international commu-
nity since 1960."3 The I.C.J. has also recognized that this substan-
tive norm which has come to enrich the corpus iuris gentium2 4 "is
complemented in certain of its aspects by General Assembly Reso-
lution 1541." '2 In this latter resolution, the U.N. General Assembly
established the principles which should guide the international
community in determining whether or not the substantive require-
ments for decolonization, as mandated by Resolution 1514, have
been met. It specifically states that "[a]s soon as a territory and its
peoples attain a full measure of self-government,"2 the obligation
of a colonizing power to transmit information to the United Na-
20. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet, 33 FOREIGN POL. 66 (1978).
21. 1971 I.C.J. 16.
22. 1975 I.C.J. 12.
23. Western Sahara, supra note 22.
24. Namibia, supra note 21.
25. Western Sahara, supra note 22.
26. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/15/Supp. 16 (1960),
Principle If., reprinted in 8 UNrrD NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 153 (1960-2).
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tions under Article 73e of the U.N. Charter shall cease.
As stated above, Puerto Rico has not achieved a full measure
of self-government,27 and exemption of the United States from
transmitting the required information is the result of a procedural
manuever that has since been repeatedly questioned in a variety of
international settings.'5 The issue is, therefore, how will Puerto
Rico be decolonized? Resolution 1541 contemplates three proce-
dural avenues for a non-self-governing territory to achieve
decolonization: "(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration
with an independent State."29 Although the first possibility is
clearly the simplest and clearest alternative to conceptualize, in
the case of Puerto Rico an analysis of each of these should be
made in light of the explicit decision of the General Assembly in
approving this resolution: "[Tihat these principles should be ap-
plied in the light of the facts and the circumstances of each case
1130
A. Integration with an Independent State: Statehood
In the case of Puerto Rico, integration means federated state-
hood. Whatever the merits of such a juridical formula, the obvious
differences between Puerto Rico and the territories which have be-
come federated states of the United States need not be belabored.
Any attempt on the part of a sovereign nation, like the United
States, to swallow a culturally and sociologically distinct nation,
would be a provocation against peace and stability which could not
meet with the approval of the international community. The sub-
stantive requirement "to end colonialism in all its manifesta-
tions""1 cannot be met by the purely procedural maneuver of ad-
ding congressional representation to a nation under colonial
domination.
27. See Clark, supra note 9, at 41-46.
28. Among these are: the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the Permanent Confer-
ence of Latin American Political Parties, the Socialist International, and the United Na-
tions' own Decolonization Committee. For an account of the events surrounding the 1978
Resolution of the U.N. Decolonization Committee in which pro-statehood and pro-common-
wealth advocates also criticized Puerto Rico's colonial status, see Cabranes, supra note 20,
at 68-71.
29. G.A. Res. 1541, Principle VI, supra note 26.
30. Id. at para. 3 (emphasis added). For the sake of conceptual clarity in this article, I
have chosen to analyze these in reverse order.
31. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 3.
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The serious problems which such an attempt would involve
have been amply documented elsewhere.32 Furthermore, U.S. pol-
icy makers do not appear to contemplate statehood in a serious
manner.3" Some aspects of the problem, however, should be noted.
The economic impact of a Spanish-speaking state far poorer than
the poorest state of the union, with a larger congressional represen-
tation than twenty-five of such states has yet to be realized and
analyzed by the congressional delegations that are bound to be
affected.
Political dissonance would also be a considerable problem. At
a time when the political attractiveness of legal action to establish
English as the official language of the United States has developed
some support, the idea of Puerto Rican integration is bound to en-
counter serious obstacles.3 The contrary proposition, that Spanish
is the official language of Puerto Rico, is also considered by
lawmakers in Puerto Rico from time to time. This can logically
raise questions as to Puerto Rico's desire or collective ability to
actually integrate. The steady refusal of Puerto Rico, during the
first forty years in this century, to adapt to the attempted imposi-
tion of the English language as the language of instruction in its
public schools, or, in 1965, to submit to anything but the Spanish
language as the language to be used in its court system, supports
this proposition. 0
Furthermore, the type of integration contemplated by Resolu-
tion 1541 calls for the integrating territory to have attained an ad-
vanced stage of self-government.3 The fact that Puerto Rico does
32. See Serrano Geyls and Gorrin Peralta, Puerto Rico y la estadidad, 40 REv. COL. AB.
P.R. 5 (1979); 41 REv. CoL. AB. P.R. 1 (1980); 42 REv. COL. AB. P.R. 1 (1981); see also Negr6n
Rivera, Beyond Section 936: A Suggested Departure from Tax-Sheltered Stagnation in Pu-
erto Rico, 47 REv. COL. AB. P.R. 143 (1986).
33. See Pastor, supra note 1, at 59; see also Garcia-Passalacqua, Intertwined Futures:
Puerto Rico, the United States, the Caribbean Basin, and Central America, 9 FLETCHER
FORUM 269, 271-276 (1985).
34. Between Nov. 1986 and Mar. 1987, three states-California, Arkansas and North
Dakota-have adopted English-as-the-official-language provisions. See Palmer, Spanglish:
Hispanics and the Bilingual Dilemma, The Boston Globe, Apr. 27, 1987, at 13, cols. 1-4.
35. See Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior, 92 D.P.R. 596 (1965); see also Vientbs Gaston, El
Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico y el problema de la lengua, in LIDERTAD Y CRITICA EN EL
ENSAYO POLITICO PUERTORRIQuEigO 397-412 (Zavala and Rodriguez eds. 1973). The author of
this essay is a noted lawyer and intellectual who prevailed in this 1965 Supreme Court case.
She has a long and distinguished history on behalf of the vernacular in Puerto Rico. Most
recently, in June 1986, she was awarded a degree honoris causa by the University of Puerto
Rico, in recognition of her contributions to legal and literary culture on the island.
36. G.A. Res. 1541, Principle IX(a), supra note 26.
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not now enjoy, nor has ever enjoyed, the required self-government,
underscores the weakness of the legal grounds which federated
statehood could have as a viable alternative for Puerto Rican
decolonization. Therefore, federated statehood could not comply
with the international legal mandate to end colonialism in all of its
manifestations in Puerto Rico.
B. Free Association with an Independent State
In international law, free association has to be more than a
term. The current official status of Puerto Rico is Estado Libre
Asociado, which would literally translate into English as Associ-
ated Free State. The association of ideas which arises from Puerto
Rico's official name in Spanish and the legal term employed for a
decolonizing status in international law is, however, misleading. Al-
though in English the term commonwealth is officially employed,
this does not alleviate the confusion. Massachusetts is one of sev-
eral states of the union that are known as commonwealths. Ca-
nada, as part of the British Commonwealth, has long possessed a
greater degree of self-government than Puerto Rico has ever had
under U.S. rule. The relationship between New Zealand and the
Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau has been labeled as one of associ-
ated states. Finally, the recent arrangement between the United
States, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Microne-
sia has been officially labeled Free Association.
If free association is to have meaning as a decolonizing
formula in the case of Puerto Rico, its meaning has to be clearly
ascertainable as reflecting established international legal standards
that would put an end to colonialism in Puerto Rico, "in all its
manifestations. "7
As mentioned above, Resolution 1541 provides a set of princi-
ples to guide the international community in determining whether
the required degree of self-government has been achieved in the
form of free association, under the mandate for decolonization of
Resolution 1514. It establishes that free association should be the
result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory.
Such consent must be "expressed through informed and demo-
cratic processes.' 'as It calls for a choice which respects the individ-
37. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 3.
38. G.A. Res. 1541, Principle VII(a), supra note 26 (emphasis added).
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uality and cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples,
and which "retains for the peoples of the territory ... the freedom
to modify the status of that territory ... " in a democratic
manner.
3 9
1. The Status Quo Revisited
Puerto Rico's executive, legislative, and judicial institutions
are clearly subject to the ultimate decision-making power of the
U.S. government. The political powerlessness of Puerto Rico's gov-
ernment throughout U.S. colonial rule has been impeccably docu-
mented, even by founders and advocates of Puerto Rico's common-
wealth status." It is clear, then, that the present status of Puerto
Rico would not, as previously noted,' 1 satisfy international norms.
Resolution 1541 calls for the right of the people of the associ-
ated territory to freely determine their internal constitution "with-
out outside interference." 2 However, the constitutional history of
Puerto Rico makes clear that the present status does not conform
to this minimum procedural requirement. For example, through
Public Law No. 447 of 1952,"' the U.S. Congress rejected Section
20 of the document which purports to be the Constitution of
Puerto Rico. This section contained social, economic, and cultural
rights which the participating Puerto Rican electorate desired to
elevate to the rank of constitutional guarantees. These rights were
not unlike those underlying the United Nations' holistic concep-
tion of human rights. Other constitutional provisions were also al-
tered, or their reach limited, by this unilateral act of Congress.
Supporters of the current status were thus faced with a mutilated
document as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition."
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., J. TW[As MONGE, HiSTORIA coNsTrruCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO: VOLS. I-IV,
(esp., Vol. IV) (1980-83). Josk A. Trias Monge is the former Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico.
41. PAIL REPORT, supra note 19; Clark, Self-Determination, supra note 9.
42. G.A. Res. 1541, Principle VII(b), supra note 26.
43. Supra note 16.
44. One of the governments of the Micronesian region, that of the Northern Marianas,
was placed in a similar dilemma more recently. See infra note 129. At least in that case, it
could be argued that the people of the Marianas were exercising their sovereignty, in that
the U.S. claims not to have ever exercised juridical sovereignty over the Trust Territories of
Micronesia. This argument may be flawed in light of the fragmentation of sovereignty which
the U.S. appears to have perpetrated in that region. See infra notes 127-130, and accompa-
nying text. Puerto Rico's sovereignty, however, has at all times since 1898 been recognized
as vested in the U.S. Congress, and Puerto Rico cannot conceivably be said to have negoti-
1987]
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It is evident that Puerto Rico's current status does not realis-
tically fall within the category of free association contemplated by
Resolution 1514. A question remains, however, which deserves fur-
ther consideration. Is there a model which would constitute a
decolonizing mode of free association in the case of Puerto Rico?
In the context of imagination and good faith, the sky is always the
limit; but recent congressional action regarding the U.S. Trust Ter-
ritories of the Northern Pacific has caught the attention of some in
Puerto Rico.' This Compact of Free Association between the
United States, on the one hand, and the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia, on the other, however, deserves
deeper analysis of some of its outstanding features.
2. The Micronesian Experience at a Glance
The area historically known as Micronesia includes the Trust
Territory of the Pacific which consists of 2,125 islands. This area
totals 1,300 square kilometers of land and spreads over 7.5 million
ated a free association arrangement in a valid exercise of legal sovereignty.
45. See Rigau, Certain Future for Puerto Rico (Oct. 24, 1986) (unpublished text of lec-
ture delivered at XIII Int'l Congress of the Latin Am. Stud. A., Boston, Mass., copy in this
author's files); see also Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Informe: Comisibn para el
estudio del desarrollo constitucional, Sub-comisi6n sobre el Pacto de libre Asociacin de
Las Islas Marshall y los Estados Federados de Micronesia con los Estados Unidos de
Amtrica, 47 REv. COL. As. PR. 303 (1986). In its Conclusions and Recommendations, this
prestigious subcommittee of the Puerto Rican Bar concludes, perhaps hastily, that
The analyzed experience of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia and their Compact of Free Association with the
United States complies in substantial respects with the substantive and proce-
dural requirements suggested by this Colegio de Abogados for the decolonization
of Puerto Rico by way of free association.
Id. at 307 (this author's translation from the original in Spanish).
This subcommittee notes, however, that the Micronesian arrangement's "main limita-
tion is the fact that the approval of the Compact and the security and defense agreements
are mutually conditioned." Id. While an analysis of this Report is beyond the scope of this
article, it should be emphasized that, if indeed the Micronesian Compact does comply with
the criteria for decolonization of the Puerto Rican Bar, the Colegio's criteria may then be at
odds with the requirements of international law. The latter requirements, which constitute
general principles of law recognized in the international community, are the frame of refer-
ence for the present analysis. Thus, any standards of the Colegio which may be in conflict
with the peremptory principle of international law regarding self-determination would have
to yield to established international precepts. Furthermore, if the Compact as applied to
Puerto Rico were in conflict with a norm of jus cogens, it would be void, regardless of its
compliance with the Colegio's less stringent standards. See art. 53, Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, opened for signature May 23, 1969, entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980, reprinted in Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit, Basic Documents
Supplement to International Law Cases and Materials, 29 (2d ed. 1987); see also Clark,
Petition, supra note 9.
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square kilometers of the Pacific Ocean, north of the Equator.' Ja-
pan occupied the islands at the beginning of World War I, after
which it was granted a Class "C" mandate in accordance with arti-
cle 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. During World
War II, the United States occupied the area and, after the War,
the United States secured formal international recognition of its
strategic interests in the region through a special strategic trustee-
ship agreement with the United Nations. This special trusteeship
required United States consent for its termination.' The three
major island chains involved in this region include: the Mariana
Islands,'" the Caroline Islands,' 9 and the Marshall Islands.50 These
major island chains at present constitute four separate govern-
ments 1 representing approximately 136,000 people,52 which is a
tiny fraction of the more than three million inhabitants of Puerto
Rico. Unlike Puerto Rico which involves a fairly homogeneous pop-
ulation (culturally and linguistically), these islands include six sep-
arate cultural groups that speak nine distinct languages."3
The main focus of this analysis is the Compact of Free Associ-
46. EUROPA YEARBOOK, 1985 WORLD SURVEY 2827 (1985).
47. A special category of trusteeship for areas designated strategic was authorized by
art. 82 of the U.N. Charter. The Strategic Trusteeship Agreement here in question was ap-
proved by the U.N. Security Council on Apr. 2, 1947, effective July 18, 1947 (61 Stat. 330
(1947)). The distinction between strategic and non-strategic is unclear, except for two
things. First, this is the only Strategic Trusteeship Agreement, and except for its approval
in 1947, the Security Council has not been actively involved. See HAMBRo & SIMONS, CHAR-
TPI OF THE UNITED NATIONS 525 (3d ad. 1969). Secondly, under its agreed terms, termination
of the trusteeship can occur only with U.S. consent (61 Stat. 330 (1947), art. 15). This latter
point, along with U.S. veto power in the Security Council, ensures near absolute control for
the United States over affairs in the region. Unlike non-strategic trusteeships over which the
General Assembly exercises ultimate responsibility, and notwithstanding the contrary posi-
tion announced by President Reagan in Nov. 1986, the Security Council has the ultimate
responsibility for the only strategic trusteeship in U.N. history. For a brilliant analysis of
the inconsistent position most recently assumed by the United States, see Clark, Written
Petition of the International League for Human Rights to the United Nations Trusteeship
Council on the Proclamation of 3 November 1986 by the President of the United States
Concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Int'l League for Human Rights,
N.Y., Apr. 2, 1987) (obtained by courtesy of Prof. Clark to this author).
48. The currently designated Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands includes
all of the Marianas except Guam, which remains an unincorporated territory of the United
States.
49. These include the currently designated Republic of Palau and the Federated States
of Micronesia.
50. These are known today as the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
51. See supra notes 48, 49 and 50.
52. EUROPA YEARBoOK, supra note 46, at 2828 (1980 Census); 2825 (1983 Census).
53. H. Rep. No. 188(11), 99th Cong., Ist Seas. 239 reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2832.
19871
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:3
ation between the United States and two of the governments: the
Republic of the Marshall Islands (MI), with its 31,041 inhabitants,
and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) with its population
of 73,755."
It should be noted that the "United Nations 'practice' with
regard to free association arrangements is inconsistent, and that no
clear norm has emerged which can be applied to the case of Micro-
nesia."' 5 Furthermore, the application of this model to Puerto Rico
might raise unrealistic expectations of economic assistance.5" Re-
gardless of the amount, however, the Micronesian model must be
analyzed to explore what features, if any, would constitute Puerto
Rican decolonization.
5 7
(a) International Status and Internal Self-Government: Fac-
tors in the Equation. The notion of free association under Resolu-
tion 1541, in light of which the Micronesian model must be consid-
ered, also has to be viewed in the context of Resolution 742, which
was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1953." This Reso-
lution states that the manner in which non-self-governing territo-
54. EUROPA YEARBOOK, supra note 46. Frequent reference will be made to both of these
governments as Micronesian.
55. Clark, Self-Determination, supra note 9, at 65-66.
56. See Legislative History, Authorization Tables, Pub. L. No. 99-239, reprinted in
1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2756-2757. The approximately $3.2 billion estimated
in Jan. 1986 in U.S. economic assistance over a fifteen-year period for the combined MI and
FSM population of approximately 105,000, would translate into the astronomic per capita
figure of more than $30,000. Over a similar period of time, the total disbursement in compa-
rable economic assistance to Puerto Rico would be over $97 billion. I am, of course, sympa-
thetic to the notion that a former colony should be so indemnified after decades of economic
exploitation. The United States, however, is living through a period of bloated federal defi-
cits making such a large economic commitment to Puerto Rico appear doubtful.
57. See Alejandro, Cubl reptiblica? El Nuevo Dia, July 11, 1986, at 51. This is one of
the few thoughtful critical assessments published in Puerto Rico regarding the nature of the
Micronesian arrangement and its possible application to Puerto Rico. See also Rechani
Agrait, Puerto Rico: imperio, El Nuevo Dia, July 2, 1986, at 45. A distinguished pro-state-
hood advocate, Rechani Agrait argues that the preliminary moves towards so-called expan-
sion of the present model which calls for a "twin-plants" economic program consonant with
the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin development policies are a way of
taking hold of the sweat of others for our benefit. A means of exploitation. A way
of profitting from the misery which others endure. And since this, before God, is
unjust, it cannot have permanence. It will end because of persuasion, because of
evolution or by force, and our economy will be forced to admit that 'the model is
exhausted' once again.
Id. (this author's translation from the original Spanish).
58. This Resolution sets out the factors which should be taken into account in deciding
whether a territory is, or is not, a territory whose people have not yet attained a full mea-
sure of self-government.
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ries can subsequently be deemed "fully self-governing [is] primar-
ily through the attainment of independence . . .," although the
General Assembly recognized that such self-government "can also
be achieved by association with another State or group of States if
this is done freely and on the basis of absolute equality."5' The
annex to this Resolution is a List of Factors indicative of the at-
tainment of independence or of other systems of self-government. 0
The factors indicative of the notion of free association relevant
here6" are divided into three categories: (a) general, (b) interna-
tional status, and (c) internal self-government.
The general factors require considering the opinion of the pop-
ulation,62 freedom of choice,63 voluntary limitation of sovereignty,"
geographical considerations,65 ethnic and cultural considerations" '
and the political advancement of the population.17  Serious
problems would remain if the Micronesian model were applied to
Puerto Rico, even if proper compliance with all of the general fac-
tors were assumed."
Legal problems arise when the relative control of the parties to
the Compact is analyzed in the context of the interaction of provi-
sions bearing on the Micronesian governments' international status
and internal self-government. e In this context, one must keep in
59. G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953), at para.
6.
60. Among these other systems of self-government, the notion of what Res. 1541 calls
integration appears as "the free association of a territory on an equal basis with the Metro-
politan or other country as an integral part of that country." See id. at Annex, Third Part.
61. G.A. Res. 742, Annex, Second Part, supro note 59 at A.1 - A.6, calls them "[flactors
indicative of the attainment of other separate systems of self-government."
62. Id. at A.1.
63. Id. at A.2.
64. Id. at A.3.
65. Id. at A.4.
66. Id. at A.5.
67. Id. at A.6.
68. The opinion of the population, its perception as to what it is free to decide and its
voluntary limitation of sovereignty are factors which are extremely susceptible to manipula-
tion in the rhetorical excesses of political propagandizing. How reliable, for instance, is an
expression of public opinion based on the premise that a people will be penalized if a choice
for independence is made? How free is that choice when the independence option is tied to
hunger or starvation by public officials who administer the Metropolitan Power's transferred
welfare funds? How voluntary can any limitation of sovereignty be when the Metropolitan
Power exercising the colony's sovereignty is always silent regarding what a period of eco-
nomic transition to independence would entail? These threshold questions point to the ob-
scurity which an in-depth analysis of these factors in the case of Puerto Rico would reveal.
69. The factors indicative of international status in the text are: (1) general interna-
tional relations, (2) change of political status and (3) elegibility for membership in the
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mind that the Compact itself" is merely part of the Compact of
Free Association Act of 1985.71 The Act comes as a Joint Resolu-
tion to approve the Compact, and for other purposes.72 This re-
quires the consideration of some of the Compact provisions in the
Titles of the Act which regulate governmental relations (Title
One), economic relations (Title Two), and security and defense re-
lations (Title Three), as well as the legal provisions regulating
other purposes in this Act of the U.S. Congress.
(i) Control Under the Micronesian Model. The beginning of
the analysis of the Micronesian model must begin with one central
question about control: Who exercises it; and how much?
At the outset, the Compact establishes that "The peoples of
the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, act-
ing through the Governments established under their respective
Constitutions, are self-governing. '"7 This presumably allows these
governments "the capacity to conduct foreign affairs . . . in their
own name and right, except as otherwise provided. . . . ,,74 This
document also states, however, that "The Government of the
United States has full authority and responsibility for security and
defense matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands and the Fed-
erated States of Micronesia."" In this context, it provides that the
MI and the FSM "shall consult, in the conduct of their foreign
United Nations. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 59, at Annex, Second Part, B.1-3. The internal
self-government factors are: (1) territorial government (its nature and measure of control or
interference, if any, by the government of another), (2) the effective participation of the
population and (3) the degree of autonomy in respect of economic, social and cultural af-
fairs, as illustrated by the degree of freedom from economic pressure exercised by a foreign
power. Id. at C.1-3.
70. The Compact of Free Association between the government of the United States,
and the governments of the MI and the FSM consists of four parts. Title One deals with
Governmental Relations; Title Two outlines Economic Relations; Title Three establishes
Security and Defense Relations; and Title Four contains General Provisions. In addition,
there are a number of separate agreements arrived at by the governments in question based
on the provisions of the Compact. See Armstrong and Hills, The Negotiations for the Fu-
ture Political Status of Micronesia (1980-1984), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 484-497 (1984).
71. The Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770
(1986) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986)).
72. Id. It contains five titles: Title I-Approval of Compact, Interpretation of, and
United States Policies Regarding Compact, Supplemental Provisions, Title II-Compact of
Free Association, Title III-Pacific Policy Reports, Title IV-Clarification of Certain Trade
and Tax Provisions of the Compact and Title V-Compact of Free Association with Palau.
73. See supra note 71, at § 111.
74. Id. at § 121 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at § 311(a).
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affairs, with the Government of the United States." ' This obliga-
tion to consult is not established under parallel principles of mutu-
ality because the government of the United States, in the conduct
of its foreign affairs, will consult with the Micronesian govern-
ments only "on matters which the Government of the United
States regards as relating to or affecting any such Government."
7
7
This contradiction naturally leads to the question of how self-gov-
erning the Micronesian governments really are in the conduct of
their foreign affairs; and how controlling are U.S. foreign affairs'
determinations over the internal decisions of the Micronesian gov-
ernments. Given other compact provisions which result in even
greater U.S. influence over Micronesian policies, it is unlikely that
these governments can be said to exercise the full degree of self-
government compatible with international legal precepts for
decolonization. For example, the United States alone, under its au-
thority and responsibility for security and defense relations under
the Compact, will determine which of its defense treaties or secur-
ity agreements will be applicable in the MI and the FSM."8 It is
"the Government of the United States, exclusively, [which] shall
assume and enjoy, as to the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia, all obligations, responsibilities, rights and
benefits" of such agreements. 79 This is one instance in which,
under the terms of the Compact, the United States could effec-
tively determine whether the Micronesians could establish trade or
cultural relations with particular countries. Although "appropriate
consultations" 80 are envisioned, it would be hard to conceive the
United States as not having the final word.
The consultation mechanisms established under the Title on
Security and Defense Relations81 may not provide an adequate off-
set for the truncated powers of the Micronesian governments.
Under the terms of the Compact, such consultations are supposed
to be conducted "expeditiously at senior levels of the Governments
concerned."8 "The subsequent determination by the Government
of the United States referred to in this section shall be made only
at senior interagency levels of the Government of the United
76. Id. at § 123(a) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at § 123(b) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at § 331(b).
79. Id. at § 331 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at § 331(b).
81. Id. at 1822.
82. Id. at § 331(b).
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States.""3 If a Micronesian government is unhappy with any such
determination made subsequent to the mentioned consultations, it
will then presumably be afforded, "on an expeditious basis, an op-
portunity to raise its concerns with the United States Secretary of
State personally and the United States Secretary of Defense per-
sonally .... -84 Arguably, this grants the Micronesian govern-
ments a preferred status in their dealings with the U.S. govern-
ment, as opposed to other foreign governments which must deal
through their embassies. This view, however, does not properly
take into account the nature of bureaucracies in the decision-mak-
ing process of the federal government. Assuming the availability of
high-level officers of the U.S. government for such Micronesian ex-
pressions of unhappiness, it is highly unlikely that they would be
caught by surprise regarding the prior determinations made "only
at senior interagency levels" 5 of their government. It is also un-
likely that these high-level functionaries would overrule the bu-
reaucratic decision-making process at this point.
There is another context in which the lop-sided control exer-
cised by the United States under this Compact can be illustrated.
The Compact allows for the storage of U.S. radioactive, toxic,
chemical or biological materials in Micronesia that are intended for
weapons use, for transit and over-flight purposes, and for times of
a national emergency declared by the President of the United
States.8 6 Given the practical flexibility of a President of the United
States in declaring a national emergency based on the U.S. percep-
tion of its national and security interests, this could include any
future invasion of a Central American or Caribbean country.87 Fur-
thermore, radioactive, toxic, chemical or biological materials "not
intended for weapons use" face no storage restriction, other than
being limited to amounts and manner "which would not be hazard-
ous to public health and safety."8 What will be an amount or
manner hazardous to public health or safety shall be determined
by the U.S. government.80 Neither the objections raised in any con-
83. Id.
84. Id. at § 313(c) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at § 313(b).
86. Id. at § 314(b).
87. President Ronald Reagan was asked whether dispatching U.S. helicopters to Bolivia
was in the national interest of the United States. He replied: "Anything we do is in our
national security interest." Robinson, Oliphant and Robinson, The Catch-Al Definition,
The Boston Globe, July 17, 1986, at 3.
88. Supra note 71, at § 314(a),(d).
89. Id. at § 314(d).
[Vol. 18:3
DECOLONIZATION OF PUERTO RICO
sultations procedure, nor the laws or public policy of any Microne-
sian associated state can serve as limitations on U.S. decisions in
this regard. The only limitations are mutual agreements, the laws
and implementing regulations of the United States, and those "in-
ternational guidelines accepted by the Government of the United
States."" In the Compact, the United States "confirms that it
shall act in accordance with the principles of international law and
the Charter of the United Nations" in the exercise of its security
and defense powers.91 If the Compact were applied "as is" to Pu-
erto Rico, it could be at odds with the prohibitions regarding nu-
clear weapons provided under the Treaty of Tlatelolco.92' This
treaty contains wide-ranging prohibitions against the use or stor-
age of nuclear weapons in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. If
the United States does not accept the provisions of a Treaty such
as Tlatelolco, the associated state's international and internal gov-
ernment capacity is correspondingly curtailed.
The Micronesian Compact further limits the internal self-gov-
ernment powers of the associated states by "the activities and op-
erations necessary for the exercise" of U.S. authority for security
and defense relations "within the lands, waters and airspace" of
the MI and FSM. 93 If the U.S. government requires the use of ar-
eas "in addition to those for which specific arrangements are con-
cluded," '94 it may request them. This raises an issue as to whether
the concerned governments may deny such requests. The language
of the Compact mandates that they "shall sympathetically con-
sider any such request and shall establish suitable procedures to
discuss it . . . .. " Does this language mean that the United
States retains powers of eminent domain under this compact? The
United States "recognizes and respects the scarcity and special im-
90. Id.
91. Id. at § 311(c).
92. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed
Additional Protocols I and II), Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281. The Treaty is the only one
of its kind, providing for a totally nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The United States
became a signatory nation to Protocol I of this Treaty (and ratified it on Nov. 23, 1981),
which undoubtedly includes Puerto Rico. This Protocol prohibits nuclear powers from man-
ufacturing, producing, acquiring or using, receiving, storing, deploying or possessing nuclear
weapons, in any way, shape or form, in territories that are, de jure or de facto under such
powers' control or jurisdiction. See Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Informe de Comis-
ion Especial sobre armamentos nucleares y el Tratado para Ia Proscripci6n de las Armas
Nucleares en La America Latina, (1984) (copy on file with the Colegio, San Juan, P.R.).
93. Supra note 71, at § 312.
94. Id. at § 321(b).
95. Id.
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portance of land"" in the Micronesian states, and undertakes to
limit its requests accordingly. Therefore, the requests which the as-
sociated states are to consider sympathetically will be for "the
minimum area necessary to accomplish the required security and
defense purpose,9 7 [and] the minimum interest in real property
necessary to support such purpose."9' The United States will seek
"first to satisfy its requirement through public real property, where
available, rather than through private real property." 99 Thus, the
issue of whether the United States exercises powers of eminent do-
main appears to be merely one of semantics; since the United
States has "full authority and responsibility for security and de-
fense matters"; e10 since the U.S. government can request the real
property interest that it deems necessary to support its exercise of
full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters;
and since the associated states must entertain any such requests
sympathetically. It has been pointed out that a failure by one of
these Micronesian governments "to refrain from activities 'incom-
patible' with United States authority" 101 could be construed as a
breach of the Micronesian side of the Compact.' 2 Similarly, a fail-
ure to comply with a request for land, sea or airspace in further-
ance of U.S. authority could be so construed, allowing the United
States the freedom to pursue some form of self-help. The most
likely form that this self-help would take would be to cut off the
funds promised under the Economic Relations Title of the
Compact. 03
It is possible that, under the Micronesian model, the price of
less than full internal self-government compatible with decoloniza-
tion requirements is satisfied by the amount of economic aid speci-
fied in the Compact, particularly in the Title on Economic Rela-
tions.104 One would assume, however, that enough freedom would
96. Id. at § 321(c).
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. The very distinction between public and private involves complex issues of pub-
lic policy, the implementation of which, in the Micronesian context, may not escape the
dominant role of U.S. authority and responsibility for security and defense matters.
100. Id. at § 311(a).
101. Clark, Setf-Determination, supra note 9, at 27.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 29. This is the remedy which Prof. Clark suggests would most likely be em-
ployed by the U.S. government. It is therefore surprising that he so narrowly interprets the
question of whether the U.S. retains powers of eminent domain, even under the 1980 version
of the Compact.
104. Supra note 71, at § 211 et. seq.
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be protected to exercise whatever degree of self-government re-
mains after the purchase price. A quick overview of the economic
provisions, however, proves disappointing.
The Grant Assistance provisions establish separate systems of
grant monies for each of the Micronesian governments encom-
passed by this Compact. Determinate amounts of aid are set as
well as timetables for the provision of such funds and their re-
stricted uses. Each of the governments is provided specific
amounts on a decreasing basis for the first, second, and third five-
year periods of the fifteen-year term of the Compact. These gov-
ernments are then required to dedicate a minimum percentage of
these amounts to a capital account in accordance with an economic
development plan in which the U.S. government must have con-
curred prior to the effective date of the Compact.'0 All grants and
other assistance are subject to continuous supervision, through
yearly audits during the first five years, and periodic audits there-
after.1" It is established that these audits will be at the expense of
the United States.]10
The implications of these audits will become apparent. First,
it should be noted that this raises legal and Constitutional ques-
tions regarding: (1) the capacity to prospectively bind the U.S.
Congress to long-term disbursements, (2) the determination of
which of the inconsistent congressional enactments is to prevail
and (3) the determination of whether domestic or international
norms will prevail.10 8 Under the terms of the Compact, however, it
is unclear "whether and to what extent Congress retains discretion
to withhold or modify annually the amounts granted to the Micro-
nesian governments while the Compact is in force." 109
Furthermore, the Compact stipulates that the grants and
achievement of goals under such grants "depends on the availabil-
ity of adequate internal revenue as well as economic assistance
from sources outside" the Micronesian states, all of which may "be
affected by the impact of exceptionally adverse economic circum-
stances." ' The document further provides that "Each of the Gov-
105. Id. at § 211(b).
106. Id. at § 233.
107. Id.
108. For further discussion of these questions, see Clark, Self-Determination, supra
note 9, at 22-23.
109. Id. at 21.
110. Supra note 71, at § 211(c).
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ernments of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia shall therefore report annually to the President of the
United States and to the Congress of the United States on the
implementation of the plans and on their use of the funds speci-
fied." ' There is, however, no provision for reciprocal reports by
the U.S. government to Micronesian authorities to justify a change
in the appropriations allotted under the provisions of the Compact.
Since the Compact is but part of a congressional enactment,
these provisions must be viewed in the context of the other pur-
poses encompassed by the Compact of Free Association Act of
1985.1' Existing statutory provisions call for an Economic Devel-
opment Plans Review Process for the FSM and MI.' These provi-
sions state that the United States will not concur with the eco-
nomic development plans of these governments until the President
of the United States has conducted a review and reported to the
Congress, and the Congress has had at least thirty working days to
review the President's findings. The report must include the views
of the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the Agency
for International Development "and the heads of such other Exec-
utive departments as the President may decide to include in the
report.""' 4 It is here that the implications of the required audits
become important.
As previously noted, the Compact requires an agreement on
the audits to be conducted. 1" Statutory provisions under the Com-
pact of Free Association Act previously cited mandates that the
"Agreement Concerning Procedures for the Implementation of
United States Economic Assistance, Programs, and Services Pro-
vided in the Compact of Free Association" shall establish the gen-
eral authority of the Comptroller General of the United States (the
General Accounting Office [G.A.O.]) to audit, as well as the
G.A.O.'s "access to the personnel and to records, documents, work-
ing papers, automated data and files, and other information rele-
vant to such audits (without cost).""
Another statutory provision contained in this controlling part
of the statute, which impacts the degree of self-government the
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Supra note 71.
113. Id. at §§ 102(b), 103(b).
114. Id.
115. See id. at § 233.
116. Id. at §§ 102(b), 103(m).
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Micronesian states will possess under the Compact, establishes
that the Comptroller General and his duly authorized representa-
tives of the G.A.O. "shall be accorded the status set forth" in the
Compact relative to diplomatic representation.'1 7 The premises of
such representative offices and their archives are subject to diplo-
matic immunity and privileges. "The property and assets of such
representative offices shall be immune from search, requisition, at-
tachment and any form of seizure unless such immunity is ex-
pressly waived."118 Official communications between or among
G.A.0. officers on the islands (even if in transit) like any other dip-
lomatic correspondence, "shall be inviolable and accorded the free-
dom and protections accorded by recognized principles of interna-
tional law to official communications of a diplomatic mission. '
This provision is highly significant. In addition to the U.S.
Embassy, and to the diplomatic personnel with whom the Micro-
nesian governments may be allowed "to conduct foreign affairs...
in their own name and right,""'2 in a manner deemed by the
United States not to contravene U.S. authority over security and
defense' the G.A.O. becomes a diplomatic mission, in effect an
untouchable watch-dog agency that can unilaterally inspect, copy,
gather, interpret, and analyze the Micronesian governments'
finances.
(ii) Delegation of Sovereignty Under the Micronesian Model.
The preceding review of a few key Compact provisions clearly indi-
cates the decisive control which the United States will continue to
exercise over the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia. There are some provisions which, in form, resemble an
associated state's decolonized capacity for international status and
internal self-government. 2 The termination provisions 28 likewise
117. Id.
118. Id. at § 152(a).
119. Id.
120. Id. at § 121(a).
121. Id. at § 311 et. seq.
122. Id. at §§ 111-127. While the Compact refers to the Micronesian states' attributes
of self-government (§ 111) and foreign relations capacity (§ 121), all of these forms are di-
luted in their substance. Thus, while the United States pledges to support Micronesian ap-
plications for membership to international or regional organizations (§ 122), this interna-
tional capacity which self-government presupposes is tempered by the requirement that any
such application requires mutual agreement for U.S. support. The other requirement of har-
mony with U.S. authority for security and defense relations has already been discussed
above. Other areas of internal autonomy are similarly curtailed. See, e.g., id. at § 131 which
gives the Micronesian Governments "full authority and responsibility to regulate their re-
19871
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:3
adopt forms similar to those required under decolonization
precepts. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of U.S. institutions and
their control on Micronesian soil, as well as the highly regulated
and massive infusion of grants under the terms of the Compact,
raise questions as to whether the Micronesian governments win be
able to develop a self-sustained interdependent economy, or
whether these mechanisms will perpetuate a continued unbalanced
dependency.
Another related issue is whether the legal capacity of the Mi-
cronesian governments to unilaterally terminate this free associa-
tion might be more theoretical than real. 124 The U.S. government
can readily exercise its power and influence over the Micronesian
governments' foreign relations. It also appears that neither of the
Micronesian governments concerned would attempt to exercise its
sovereign will contrary to that of the United States due to the po-
tential economic disruption which the U.S. government could le-
gally inflict upon these countries under the terms of the Compact.
This economic control is the best insurance of Micronesian faithful
compliance.
spective foreign and domestic communications." But see, id. at § 132, which requires that
they permit the U.S. government to operate telecommunications "to the extent necessary"
to fulfill other U.S. government obligations under the Compact and the terms of separate
agreements which simultaneously come into effect. Similarly, in the area of immigration
controls, see id. at §§ 141, 142, which exemplify the unbalanced mutuality of powers. Also,
in the area of environmental protection, powers are equally slanted in favor of U.S. author-
ity over security and defense matters in §§ 161-163. Finally, the amounts in damages pro-
vided for victims of nuclear tests conducted in the islands of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap
and Utrik of the Marshall Islands, and the settlement of claims provisions under §§ 103(f)
and (g), as well as under the § 177 agreements in "full and final settlements of all claims,"
deserve separate treatment and an analysis of what those claims would have been worth
under generally applicable principles of tort law.
123. Id. at §§ 441-454.
124. Prof. Clark has noted the mounting difficulty with which the Micronesian govern-
ments could opt entirely out of this free association arrangement through the Compact's
1980, 1982, 1984 and 1986 versions. These difficulties evidently have significant implications
so far as the U.N. norms on decolonization are concerned. He recalls that the U.N. Commis-
sion which examined the possibilities of a free association status in the matter of Togoland
in the late 1950's for the General Assembly expressed the view that this French-adminis-
tered entity should have full powers to terminate the arrangement unilaterally. He con-
cludes that
[Tihe combined effect of the various [military security and defense termination]
provisions coupled with permanent denial [under the 1986 version] is to place
too great a fetter on the power of the [MI, FSM and the Republic of Palau] to
opt out unilaterally ....Accordingly, we do not believe that the [free associa-
tion] arrangments satisfy U.N. norms for a proper exercise of self-determination.
Clark, Petition, supra note 9, at 7.
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The actions which the MI and the FSM can take in the area of
international commercial relations under the Compact may not be
much different from those that Puerto Rico can take under its pre-
sent colonial status. In the case of the Micronesian governments,
the outer limits appear to always require consonance with U.S. au-
thority over security and defense, for which prior consultations are
required. The recent U.S. official position regarding Puerto Rico
has been that Puerto Rico may also engage in commercial relations
with other countries after prior consultations with the United
States.
12 5
An argument has been made that the Compact provides an
approximately balanced spectrum of the quantum of discretion
and powers between the parties. Even with the 1980 version of the
Compact, such balancing, in this author's view, drastically tips the
scales of control in favor of the metropolitan power.1s0
A final argument that could be made in favor of this Com-
pact's fulfillment of international legal decolonization require-
ments is its valid delegation of sovereign powers. This argument is
supported by the fact that, even at the time that this unique secur-
ity trusteeship was being negotiated (immediately after World War
II), the United States expressly acknowledged that making this
trusteeship an integral part of the United States did not imply
125. According to an Associated Press report, the White House submitted a report by
Michael G. Kozak of the U.S. Dep't of State to the House of Representatives Committee on
the Interior and Insular Affairs. The Kozak Report indicates that Puerto Rico is in the same
position as the Virgin Islands, Guam, Samoa, and the Northern Marianas in this regard. A
distinction is reportedly made vis-a-vis the MI and FSM because of their different political
organization which allows them to autonomously conduct their own foreign relations. In the
case of Puerto Rico, the purpose of a wide-ranging and conscious coordination with the U.S.
government is to insure that there be no conflict between Puerto Rican and U.S. interests.
Puerto Rico puede pactar, pero despu~s de consultar, El Reportero, July 19, 1986, at 3,
cola. 1-4. Any real differences between the substantive regulation which the Compact with
the Micronesian governments entails, and this articulation regarding other territories are
hard to see. What is not difficult to see is how readily the U.S. government is bound to
determine the existence of conflicts between Puerto Rico and U.S. interests. In Dec. 1986,
U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, denied permission to the government of Puerto Rico
to enter into commercial agreements with Japan, which could have presumably helped Pu-
erto Rico's ailing economy. The agreement would have given Japanese manufacturers tax
breaks similar to those enjoyed by U.S. firms which repatriate their profits under § 936 of
the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Secretary Shultz disallowed Puerto Rico's commercial
agreement with Japan because it conflicted with U.S. policy, which does not view tax-spar-
ing treaties with other countries favorably. See Caribbean Update, Feb. 1987, at 15, col. 2.
126. See Clark, Self-Determination, supra note 9, where Prof. Clark makes this same
argument. In hindsight, one can surmise that his view undoubtedly arises from the fact that
at the time of publication of his otherwise fine article in 1980, Congress had not yet legis-
lated the final version of the Compact.
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U.S. sovereignty over the territory then known as Micronesia. 2 '
The problem with this argument is that the trust territory as a
whole encompassed more than just the presently constituted gov-
ernments of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia. Thus, this fragmentation of the trust territory as a path
to decolonization may not be authorized by the Charter of the
United Nations, for it would involve a fragmentation of sover-
eignty.128 It has also been pointed out that the United States ac-
tively and wrongly encouraged separatist sentiments in the Mari-
anas and ignored the preference of the rest of Micronesia to
maintain the integrity of the entire trust territory. 2 ' The Congress
of Micronesia had also raised such objections in a harshly worded
1973 resolution. 80
It is evident, therefore, that the very notion of delegated sov-
ereignty in the case of the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia may have been flawed from the start. In any
event, such an arrangement would be of no help in decolonizing
Puerto Rico. As previously noted, the United States, in the exer-
cise of its trusteeship powers over Micronesia, allegedly did not in-
tend to exercise Micronesian sovereignty. The power which the
United States exercised over the trust territories ostensibly ema-
nates from the President's authority over foreign affairs, which in
turn is derived from the President's treaty-making power under
the U.S. Constitution."3' The power of the United States over terri-
tories is the power of sovereignty vested in the U.S. Congress by
the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 2 It appears, then,
that "[M]any of the provisions of the Compact relating to the exer-
127. Hills, Compact of Free Association for Micronesia: Constitutional and Interna-
tional Law Issues, 18 IN r'L LAW. 583, 590-608 (1984).
128. See S. REP. No. 596, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS
448. "[T]he people of the Northern Marianas constitute less than 13 percent of the Trust
Territory and cannot be said to have the 'right' of self-determination separate and apart
from the other peoples of the Trust Territory." Id.
129. Id. at 464.
The advocates of the Covenant [for the Marianas] also overlook the fact that the
plebiscite was a flawed expression of the will of the people of the Marianas, as
alternatives such as independence or free association were not offered; and the
financial benefits to be provided to the Marianas were tied to acceptance of the
Covenant.
Id.
130. See Leibowitz, The Marianas Covenant Negotiations, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 19, 20
n.5 (1980).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 2.
132. U.S. CONsT. art. IV., § 3, cl. 2.
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cise of freely associated state sovereignty are inherently inconsis-
tent with and inapplicable to the status of the territories," ' 8 in-
cluding, of course, Puerto Rico.1 3 4 Before Puerto Rico could validly
delegate its sovereignty in a free association arrangement, it must
first be vested with sovereignty. This means that Puerto Rico's
decolonization can only be achieved through independence.
(b) International Status and Internal Self-Government: Con-
cluding the Equation of Factors. In light of the preceding analysis
of Compact provisions, it is apparent that the "[d]egree or extent
to which the Territory exercises the power to enter freely into di-
rect relations of every kind with other governments and with inter-
national institutions and to negotiate, sign and ratify international
instruments freely ' ' 3s is greatly curtailed by the required interpre-
tations of consonance with U.S. authority over security and de-
fense. Furthermore, it clearly appears that, in any consultation
process, the ultimate decision regarding such consonance is in the
hands of the metropolitan country, namely the United States. The
"[dlegree or extent to which the metropolitan country is bound,
through constitutional provisions or legislative means, by the freely
expressed wishes of the Territory in negotiating, signing and rati-
fying international conventions which may influence conditions in
the Territory" ' is at best nebulous.
The Compact gives the United States a strategic right to close
the territories to the military forces of any other nation, under sep-
arate agreements established concurrently with the Compact.
Under those separate agreements, the military use and operating
rights of the United States (except those with the FSM), as well
as U.S. authority to deny third country military access, have a
duration which exceeds the initial term of the compact ... and
the defense guarantee by the United States set forth [under Sec-
tion 354(b)] will continue, consequently, for those longer
periods.'
In the Federated States of Micronesia, the status of forces and the
military use and operating rights of the United States remain in
force for fifteen years from the effective date of the Compact, and
133. Hills, supra note 127, at 607.
134. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), which asserts congressional power over
Puerto Rico under the territorial clause.
135. Supra note 59, at annexed List of Factors, Second Part, B.1.
136. Id.
137, Legislative History, supra note 55, at 2744.
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in the Marshall Islands, the term is thirty years. In both, however,
mutual security agreements are to remain in force until terminated
or otherwise amended by mutual agreement. In the case of the
United States, this means only by the enactment of legislation (in
other words, as quickly or as slowly as U.S. interests may re-
quire).188 This lack of ability to unilaterally terminate the arrange-
ment raises questions as to the real power of the free associated
states to exercise self-determination.
Thus the internal self-government capacity of the Micronesian
states suffers as a consequence of these military arrangements. The
"[d]egree of autonomy in respect of economic, social and cultural
affairs"'189 varies inversely with the threat of withdrawal of eco-
nomic grants and assistance in cases of Micronesian discrepancies
with U.S. foreign policy. The "nature and measure of control or
interference. . ."I" of the United States with respect to the inter-
nal self-government of the Micronesian governments are not
merely disproportionate, but constant for fifteen years or longer.
The international status and internal self-government which
this association arrangement grants to the Marshall Islands and
the Federated States of Micronesia appear to fall considerably
short of the standards which international law mandates for
decolonization. They most certainly would not be satisfactory in
the case of a country which, like Puerto Rico, has been deprived of
even nominal sovereignty under its current status as an unincorpo-
rated territory.
An analogous form of free association could represent a viable
alternative for a small state like Puerto Rico on its way out of
colonialism, if its transitory nature towards independence is clearly
recognized. But as a permanent solution, an equation for the
decolonization of Puerto Rico under the Micronesian model simply
will not work. A Micronesian-type arrangement for Puerto Rico,
whatever its name, would clearly exhibit the kind of control which
is normally associated with colonial domination as it does in the
Micronesian model.
138. Id. at 2776.
139. Supra note 59, at annexed List of Factors, C.3.
140. Id. at C.1.
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C. Emergence as a Sovereign Independent State: Indepen-
dence
Independence is by itself the clearest means through which
nations move towards decolonization under international law. This
is not to deny that the world has become interdependent to a very
large degree. However, the technological advances in rapid travel,
satellite communications, and growing networks of commerce, can
not turn the interdependence of nations into a smokescreen to
mask the need for independent juridical sovereignty and self-de-
termination of countries and peoples for the achievement of world
peace, security and stability. "The 'age of interdependence' is here,
but there have surely been other ages of interdependence, such as
the interdependence of colonies and mother countries and that be-
tween hegemonic powers and client states. The existence of inter-
dependence does not justify the terms ... ""'
The international status of an independent country is easily
ascertained by its unqualified juridical power, full international re-
sponsibility for acts inherent in the exercise of its external sover-
eignty, and corresponding acts in the administration of its internal
affairs. '2 Its eligibility for membership in the United Nations, its
power to enter into direct relations of all kinds with governments
and international institutions, as well as its power to negotiate,
sign and ratify all sorts of international instruments symbolize this
status. 4" A similar example is a nation's sovereign right to provide
for its national defense as it deems appropriate in consonance with
principles of international law."
An independent country's juridical powers of internal self-gov-
ernment allow it complete freedom to choose the form of govern-
ment which its people desire1 4 5 and to freely protect itself from
control or interference by another country in its selection and es-
tablishment of a particular form of internal government. 1 ' Its
complete autonomy over economic, social and cultural affairs 1 4 is
beyond dispute.
141. Minta, The Lomb Convention: A Case Study of North-South Relations 37 (1979)
(unpublished thesis, Harvard Law School).
142. G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp., supra note 59 at A.1.
143. Id. at A.2 & A.3.
144. Id. at A.4.
145. Id. at B.1.
146. Id. at B.2.
147. Id. at B.3.
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The liberation of former colonial countries and peoples began
to gather impetus after World War II. The creation of the United
Nations reflected the awareness, on the part of the international
community, of the need to accommodate the new international
configuration. The U.N. Charter welcomed the emergence of new
nations in its Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories
in Chapter XI. The General Assembly immediately began to deal
substantively and procedurally with the emerging international
norm against colonialism. Resolutions 648 and 742 of the U.N.
General Assembly set the stage for the controlling mandate of Res-
olution 1514 of 1960.
While the United Nations added new legal impetus to the
processes of decolonization throughout the world, a counter-cur-
rent of discontent with the proliferation of new nations began to
emerge. It would not have been good politics, nor consonant with
the spirit of the U.N. Charter to vote against such international
declarations as the 1960 Resolution; therefore, some major powers,
including the United States abstained. Gradually, grumblings gave
way to rumblings, until a theory could be advanced to justify cur-
tailing the expanding role of Third World nations in the law-mak-
ing powers which the U.N. General Assembly began to develop. Fi-
nally, a theory was advanced voicing concern for the proliferation
of mini or microstates.
The concern regarding ministates, which were remote, isolated
and poor was initially voiced by spokespersons of macrostates who
had traditionally failed to mention why the new nations were
deemed remote and isolated. There was no recognition of why re-
mote and isolated ministates were poor and less developed eco-
nomically. Also absent was any mention of how former metropoli-
tan powers had often drawn a former colony's boundaries in such a
way that caused regions inhabited by indigenous peoples to be
fragmented and fused with other distinct groups on either side of
the contiguous boundaries of new nations." What ostensibly wor-
ried the wealthier and economically developed macrostates was
that "the price of freedom [for ministates] should not be too
high."'149 Could ministates "grasp the intricate international ma-
148. Eritrea within Ethiopia, the Punjab between India and Pakistan, and the Miskito
region between Honduras and Nicaragua illustrate this practice. This and other historical
reasons have led some small states to echo this concern in part.
149. Fisher, The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs, 62 A.S.I.L. 164,
167 (1968) (Panel discussion, hereinafter Panel).
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chinery and the complex activities of the family of international
organizations? '" 10 Could they "afford to open an adequately
staffed observer's office in New York or Geneva?" '151 Could they
contribute "a fair share to meeting the costs of the organiza-
tion?" 52 Would admission to the United Nations of states "that
clearly do not have the resources [to pay] undermine both the
prestige and usefulness of the organization?" If once admitted,
would they have "an equal voice with members who [could]
contribute? '"18
These considerations form part of a long list of very real
problems facing ministates. Nevertheless, some small states have
played very important roles in the history of international rela-
tions. Exponents of this concern theory readily admit that the Re-
public of Venice was a world power in the 15th century with a pop-
ulation of less than 150,000.15 They will not contest that it was
quite normal for small and insignificant states to participate in
world conferences, such as the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815."'1
It should be noted that Japan, a nation not much larger than the
United Kingdom, is today a major economic power in the world in
spite of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We should not forget that Eng-
land (which is part of a small island north of France), France
(which is far smaller than its former colony, Algeria) and the even
smaller Federal Republic of Germany (which came into existence
after World War II) are all relatively small but prosperous nation-
states.
Several small Third World nations have achieved respectable
growth rates in their GNPs. Barbados and Uruguay in the Western
Hemisphere, Tunisia in Africa, Jordan and Syria in the Middle
East, and Singapore and Malaysia in the Far East have all fared
better than Puerto Rico's per capita GNP growth in recent
years. 156
The ministate problem conceptualized by former colonial pow-
150. Rapoport, Panel, supra note 149, at 159.
151. Id.
152. Brown, Panel, supra note 149, at 180 (speaking for the U.S. Dep't of State).
153. Id.
154. Rapoport, Panel, supra note 150, at 155.
155. Id.
156. See Negr6n Rivera, From Stagnation to Growth: Prospects for a New Economic
Strategy, 7 (Oct. 24, 1986) (unpublished paper delivered at XIII Int'l Congress of the Latin
Am. Stud. A., Boston, Mass., copy in this author's files). See generally THE WORLD BANK
ATLAs (1985).
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ers involves former colonies. These colonies existed primarily for
the economic benefit of certain sectors of the metropolitan states.
Now that these former colonies seek their place as sovereign equals
in the community of nations, the former colonial powers are
concerned.
As Jacques G. Rapoport has recognized, "[Tihe ministate...
wants to belong to the world community." '57 It wants to be able to
present its case to the world community if its special interests
are at stake, or whenever it has a contribution to make . . . to
benefit from international cooperation . . .; [to seek] advice or
assistance about possible changes in its status or in its interna-
tional relations... ; [or to obtain] some form of moral or mate-
rial support in cases where the emergent ministate is reluctant
to rely too heavily on the former colonial power.5 8
In the case of a small country like Puerto Rico, independence
would provide the most flexibility in attaining the international
status and full internal self-government necessary for successful
decolonization. Independence for Puerto Rico would allow for the
creative development of economic policies tailored to Puerto Rico's
domestic requirements. " Finally, independence would allow for
the imaginative construction of new international, institutional ar-
rangements through peaceful and friendly relations with other na-
tions, including the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1974, the United Nations adopted by consensus the Decla-
ration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order,'" in
which it declared that "The greatest and most significant achieve-
ment during the last decades has been the independence from co-
lonial and alien domination of a large number of peoples and na-
tions which has enabled them to become members of the
community of free peoples."16 It further proclaims that "[Tihe re-
maining vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupa-
tion, racial discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its
157. Rapoport, Panel, supra note 150, at 155.
158. Id.
159. See R. WEISSKOFF, FACTORIES AND FOODSTAmPS: THE PUERTO Rico MODEL OF DE-
vEopmzNr (1985); see also Negr6n Rivera, supra note 32, at 171-182.
160. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. Al (1974).
161. Id. at para. a.l.
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forms [continue to impede] the full emancipation and progress" of
developing countries.""2 It points to the ever-widening gap between
developed and developing countries as a serious threat to pro-
gress,"s and calls for "[iInternational co-operation for development
[as the] shared goal and common duty of all countries. . . ."'" It
proclaims that the new international economic order should be
founded upon the full respect for many of the principles which
have become part of international law. Among these principles are
the "sovereign equality of states, self-determination of all peoples,
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, territorial
integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other
States,"1 5 and "the right of developing countries and the peoples
and territories which are under colonial and racial domination and
foreign occupation to achieve their liberation and to regain effec-
tive control over their natural resources and economic
activities." '' e
Some small but significant steps have already been taken to-
wards new international institutional arrangements that constitute
a foundation for a more equitable distribution of wealth, power
and opportunities in the international arena. The European Com-
munities which have grown out of the Treaty of Rome since 1957
are a case in point. The two Yaounde Conventions and the Arusha
Agreement which preceded the first Lom6 Convention of 1975, as
well as the subsequent Lom6 Conventions of 1980 and 1985 can be
useful guides in charting new ways for former colonies to relate to
their former colonial rulers without retreating to a neocolonial
womb. 1 7 In addition to re-fashioning the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive to open up more possibilities for multilateral economic agree-
ments,'" there is plenty of room to explore new international insti-
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at para. a.3.
165. Id. at para. a.4(a).
166. Id. at para. a.4(h).
167. See Rodriguez-Orellana, supra note 18, at 63-70. Although the high expectations
created by the Lom Conventions have not materialized, particularly among Caribbean sig-
natory countries, this is at least partly due to "the fact that Caribbean countries on the
whole export relatively little to the EEC compared to the USA." See Gandia, Lome and the
Caribbean 14 (1986) (unpublished paper prepared for the Caribbean Studies Association
Conference, Caracas, Venezuela).
168. Contrast the current approach which calls for lopsided, top-heavy bilateral execu-
tive agreements between the United States and individual countries in the Caribbean Re-
gion. See Rodriguez-Orellana, supra note 18, at 72-78.
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tutional arrangements with Central America,' South America, 7 '
and the Caribbean.1
71
The chisel with which to sculpt the fine features on these and
other possible international institutional arrangements is the jurid-
ical independence of sovereign nation-states. The Micronesian
model of free association is seriously flawed. In the case of Puerto
Rico, it does not represent a viable decolonizing alternative. Inde-
pendence, however, contains the necessary flexibility to make new
solutions possible. It is the ethical, democratic, international im-
perative which presupposes an end to colonialism in all its mani-
festations. In the case of Puerto Rico, it requires us to look beyond
colonialism's cloaked and continuing attempts to rename Puerto
Rico's colonial problem as its solution.
169. The possibility of reviving the Central American Court of Justice, which existed
for a decade at the beginning of the 20th century, should be explored. See Scott, The Cen-
tral American Peace Conference of 1907, 2 Am. J. hr'L L. 121 (1908); Anderson, The Peace
Conference of Central America, 2 Am. J. INT'L L. 144 (1908); -Official Documents, Conven-
tion for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 231
(1908).
170. See Brazil, Argentina Agree to Integrate Economies, The Boston Globe, July 15,
1986, at 27, cola. 4-5.
171. CARICOM is not yet dead in the Caribbean. See Caribbean Update, July 1986, at
3, col. 1.
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